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ABSTRACT
Academicworkhasnotedagrowth in theprominenceof civil society in
international political-economic life, yet the conditions under which
such civil society presence is developed, the ways in which it is
manifest and their implications are still incompletely understood.
The recent international policy debate on the allocation of spectrum
provides a useful case for research aiming to close this gap in
knowledge and is the focus of this article. It provides evidence of a
signiﬁcant – though ultimately highly contingent – civil society
presence in the spectrum debate. It explains this through the
construction of a framework of international civil society strategic
alignment. This is used to illustrate and explain the conditions that
allowed civil society to articulate its voice and the means through
which and how this was achieved. The article contributes to the
literature on civil society activism in communications by illustrating
both its capacity for action – but also the highly signiﬁcant
limitations placed on it – in utilizing strategic alignment to engage in
international public policy making debates.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
Processes of international public policy making are complex and contested, especially
those involving decisions on the allocation of scarce resources with strategic technical
and economic signiﬁcance. They can often take place in long-standing international insti-
tutional environments in which states continue to be the key decision-taking actors,
though changes in the international political economy in the direction of the neo-liberal-
ism (Harvey, 2007) in recent decades have meant that commercial players are now fre-
quently prominent in such contexts. Despite the often strong public interest character
of matters under consideration, scope for the presence of civil society actors – that is
those which are non-state, or non-commercial in character and practice – would thus
appear highly limited. Academic work has, nevertheless, asserted a growth in the promi-
nence of civil society in international political-economic life (O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, &
Williams, 2000; Scholte, 2007). Yet, the conditions under which such civil society presence
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is developed, the ways in which it is manifest and their implications are still incompletely
understood. The recent international policy debate on the allocation of spectrum provides
a particularly apposite context for research aiming to close this gap in knowledge and is the
focus of this article.
Spectrum is one of the most strategically signiﬁcant public and commercial communi-
cation resources (Harvey & Ala-Fossi, 2016). The article’s focus is on deliberations in the
EU which took place in the lead up to the International Telecommunication Union’s
(ITU) 2015 World Radio Conference and subsequent related EU policy decisions. The
ITU is the long-standing international institutional context for decisions on the pattern
of allocation of the airwave spectrum. WRC-15 was preceded in Europe by a particularly
controversial debate on potential reallocation of spectrum away from broadcasting and
towards the burgeoning mobile communications sector.
Though potential international policy change in spectrum held highly signiﬁcant public
interest implications for the media sector and was thus of concern to civil society actors,
the operating conditions of the international public policy environment for spectrummili-
tated strongly against their participation for four reasons. First, organizing at the inter-
national level is costly in terms of time and ﬁnancial resources. Second, spectrum policy
is innately technical in character, often making a precise understanding of its social and
public interest signiﬁcance and future diﬃcult to determine and articulate. Third, the par-
ticular issue of potential spectrum capacity transfer at stake in the debate around WRC-15
involved consideration of policy change of an inter-sub-sectoral variety. That is, it pre-
sented the extra challenge to all concerned of understanding broader changes that are
ongoing in the highly speciﬁc sister communication ﬁelds of broadcasting and telecommu-
nications that mean they have come to inhabit increasingly the same space. Fourth, as
might be expected, the strategic commercial signiﬁcance of potential policy change in
spectrum meant that the debate arena was heavily populated by powerfully resourced
industry players from the broadcasting and telecommunication sectors.
Despite this, the article provides evidence of a signiﬁcant – though ultimately highly con-
tingent – civil society presence in the spectrum debate, where the key actors were those repre-
senting the viewer and listener (the Voice of the Viewer and Listener – VLV, the European
Voice of the Viewer and Listener – Euralva). The Uni Global Union – Media, Entertainment
and Arts (UNI MEI) and the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) also made signiﬁcant
input. The article explains this presence through the construction of a framework of inter-
national civil society strategic alignment. This original framework is derived from existing
understandings of the capacity of civil society for action from the literatures on global civil
society activism and lobbying. It is then applied to illustrate and explain the conditions that
allowed civil society to articulate its voice in the spectrum debate and the means through
which and how this was achieved. In so doing, the article contributes to extending the litera-
ture on civil society activism in communications by illustrating both civil society’s capacity for
action–but also the highly signiﬁcant limitations placed on it– in utilizing strategic alignment
to engage in international public policy making debates.
After brieﬂy setting out its methodological approach, the article provides an outline of
key changes in broadcasting and mobile communication which underpinned the at –
times-fractious debate on spectrum policy change and the public interest. Thereafter, it
provides a critique of relevant literature on global civil society activism in European
public policy making and constructs a strategic alignment framework (see Table 1).
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This is followed by a brief outline of the importance of spectrum, its international policy
institutional setting, and recent changes of perspective on spectrum policy in Europe in the
light of media convergence. The article then undertakes an application of the elements of
its framework to the example of civil society, the debate on spectrum reallocation in
Europe in the lead up to WRC-15 and subsequent EU policy actions in the ﬁeld.
Data Sources and Methodology
The research for this article draws on qualitative data gathered from primary and second-
ary sources, triangulated with semi-structured stakeholder interviews. The academic lit-
erature on spectrum policy activism in relation to the ITU’s WRC is understandably
sparse. Stakeholder websites, specialized electronic publications and online newspaper
articles provided an initial information base. Analysis of submissions to key public consul-
tations on national and supranational level spectrum policy in the lead-up to WRC-15
served as an important primary data source. These consultations were carried out by insti-
tutions such as the European Communications Committee (ECC) of the European Con-
ference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the EU’s Radio
Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), the European Commission and the UK media regulator,
Ofcom. Analysis of these provided evidence of key public and private sector actors in the
debate and their positions. The research tracked inputs from civil society actors, which led
to a particular focus on the input of the Wider Spectrum Group (WSG), comprising civil
society, private commercial and publicly funded non-civil society organizational member-
ship. A series of interviews were then undertaken covering ten of the member organiz-
ations of the Group: the Association of Professional Wireless Production Technologies
(APWPT); Broadcast Networks Europe (BNE); European Coordination of Independent
Producers (CEPI); Digital UK; the European Broadcasting Union (EBU); the European
Federation of Journalists (EFJ); Pearle* – Live Performance Europe; UNI MEI; the
Voice of the Listener and Viewer (VLV), and the European Alliance of Listeners’ and
Viewers’ Associations (Euralva).
The Spectrum Debate: Broadcasting, Broadband and the Public Interest in
Wireless Communication
Terrestrial television and radio broadcasting systems have, in Europe, for the most part,
utilized key parts of the UHF communication spectrum to deliver their services. Other
Table 1. Civil society activism as alignment in spectrum public policy.
Alignment Context
Information/knowledge/experience asset possession
Problem deﬁnition capacity
Presence of receptive actors (state, public and private)
Existence of windows of policy opportunity/issue salience
Alignment Process
Cooperative ﬂexibility
Use of outside lobbying tactics
Willingness to confront
Argument diversiﬁcation capacity
Source: Authors.
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signiﬁcant users of spectrum in this range have been the providers of services related to the
maintenance of public health and security, as well as providers of satellite communications
and parties concerned with the testing and development of equipment and systems poten-
tially deployable through the network in the future. Preferences for the shape of this
system and its actual deployment were largely a matter of national concern and discretion.
However, given the international signiﬁcance of coordinating eﬀectively the use and devel-
opment of radio communication, agreement on the allocation of spectrum was reached in
the context of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), based in Geneva. The
economic and social importance of spectrum has imbued it with distinct political signiﬁ-
cance (Delaere & Cullell-March, 2014, p. 360).
Historically, in Western Europe, much of the use of the UHF spectrum had underpin-
ning it a strong public interest rationale. In terms of broadcasting, this reﬂected the devel-
opment of public service radio and television through most of the twentieth century
(Tracey, 1998). Even as terrestrial broadcasting systems using the airwaves became
more commercialized from the late 1980s, through primarily the deployment of
funding models other than the licence fee and the introduction of more competition
(Brants & Siune, 1992), the idea of terrestrial broadcasting services as providing at least
one of the core universal public service staples of education, information and entertain-
ment to audiences has persisted (Ferrell Lowe & Martin, 2014).
The huge expansion in television broadcasting in recent decades has been facilitated by
capacity infrastructure increases of various kinds. A big part of this has been digitalization
techniques, which have aﬀected cable and airwave based systems (speciﬁcally satellite and
terrestrial) alike. Digitalization – through, for example, compression technology – has
aﬀorded more eﬃcient use of the spectrum, and has called forth a major process of tran-
sition across most of the world from analogue to digital broadcasting. Such a movement
has resulted in the ‘freeing up’ of key parts of the spectrum: the so-called ‘digital dividend’
(Wheeler, 2016).
Availability of new spectrum capacity has also coincided with a particularly signiﬁcant
period in the growth of the mobile communications industry. The emergence of personal
mobile communications services has been one of the most prominent developments in tele-
communications of the last 30 years. The value of mobile communications has recently been
turbo-charged by the growth of broadband Internet communications services. This was
initially developed through cable based communications; however the growth of high
quality mobile Internet broadband services is now seen as a key strategic goal for an increas-
ingly diverse communications sector (Bauer, 2010). Whilst the industry cliché of the 1990s
that ‘the future is mobile’ has not materialized entirely, the mobile handset, or ‘smartphone’,
has become a device allowing users to send and receive voice, data, text and pictures in com-
bination: online communication is becoming increasingly mobile (Dwyer, 2010). Like its
‘ﬁxed link’ broadband equivalent, the timely availability of network capacity (Papacharissi
& Zaks, 2006) – in this case spectrum – is considered an essential ingredient in the future
of mobile communication. These separate developments in broadcasting and mobile com-
munications have taken centre stage in the debate on the digital dividend. In essence, the
mobile communications sector has demanded more spectrum; the broadcasting sector
has resisted strongly any attempt to provide this at its expense.
An important feature of this contestation has been the input of civil society actors from
the broadcasting realm. Prominent here was the VLV, the UK’s viewer/consumer
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representative body which advocates for preservation of the public value of public service
broadcasting (PSB) in the UK and Europe. Its work has shown that broadcasters and
national broadcasting regulatory bodies can be responsive to the concerns of external
parties, including civil society groups (VLV interviewee, June 21, 2016). The VLV con-
siders the terrestrial TV system as vital due to its free-to-air characteristics, a key
element of the universalism that is a fundamental principle of PSB (VLV interviewee,
May 19, 2016). It has argued that
it is important that spectrum continues to be available to broadcasters to support the poten-
tial of future broadcast technology. Broadcasters have traditionally invested in Research and
Development to develop and deploy new advanced technologies that enhance their services
to viewers and listeners. Mobile communications providers tend to argue in terms of what
they can do in the future; however, broadcasters have a strong evidence base of past achieve-
ments in their argument to have spectrum available to them. A vital element of the current
policy environment is that viewers don’t realize that they are being asked to choose between
the broadcasting and the mobile path into the future. (VLV interviewee, June 21, 2016)
For organizations like the VLV, apart from funding constraints, a major challenge has
been gaining access to key decision-making venues like WRC events.
Strategic Alignment as Civil Society Activism in European Public Policy
Processes
Recent academic work highlights the growing inﬂuence exerted by civil society interests
organized internationally (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; O’Brien et al., 2000; Risse, Ropp, &
Sikkink, 1999; Scholte, 2007; Sikkink, 2011) leading O’Brien et al. (2000) even to
discern, in the economic sphere, the growth of ‘complex multilateralism’. However,
whilst civil society has pressed inﬂuentially for institutional and policy change, any type
of bottom-up global governance has been found to be ‘in its infancy’ (p. 208). In the
EU, Kohler-Koch (2010) argues that civil society organizations undertake discursive
and interactive public functions, in the process representing societal interests.
A noteworthy aspect of transnational civil society activism is alignment with private
actors (Flohr, Wolf, Rieth, & Schwindenhammer, 2010). Cullen (2015, p. 206) contends
that ‘diverse organizations can cooperate eﬀectively in loose, episodic and strategic alli-
ances’. Mahoney (2007) notes collaborative behaviour involving information sharing
after key meetings, email circulation of key discussion issues, conference call brieﬁngs
and sending of joint communications to policy makers along a ‘continuum from very
informal and loose, comprised of occasional information sharing, to highly coordinated
enterprises with logos, letterheads and secretariats’. The EU policy-making domain
allows for a wide range of lobbying activity, performed by diﬀerent types of collective for-
mations. So-called ad-hoc issue coalitions serve the two important purposes of showing a
depth and variety of actors in favour of a particular approach and allowing resource
eﬃciencies among the coalition’s members. Pijnenburg (1998, p. 305) has deﬁned four
main characteristics of ad hoc coalitions: ‘little or no formalization’; ‘limited duration’;
‘considerable autonomy of coalition partners’; and focus on ‘a single-issue’. Coen (2004)
notes how business actors can use coalitions to gain access to exclusive policy fora –
our analysis of the European spectrum policy case provides evidence that such coalitions
have also proven beneﬁcial for civil society groups, though through the provision of
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indirect means of access. The primary purpose of the coalition examined in this article was
to demonstrate to policy-makers a wider community support for preserving the status quo
allocation of spectrum to the broadcasting sector. In ad hoc coalitions, actors possessing
limited resources tend to occupy positions on the periphery of the coalition (Hula, 1995 in
Mahoney, 2007). In our case, operators managing the digital terrestrial television (DTT)
infrastructure in the Broadcast Networks Europe (BNE) association, together with
public service and private commercial broadcasters formed the ‘core’ of the coalition, initi-
ating its creation. Civil society groups representing audiences (VLV) and labour (UNIMEI
and EFJ) occupied the periphery, joining the coalition once the core was created.
Civil society contributions to the policy making process can have distinct practical
value through their possession of key assets, such as technical information, as well as
knowledge and expertize. Relatedly, civil society can possess the capacity to make a signiﬁ-
cant contribution to policy innovation and development. This may emerge through an
understanding of technical or human behavioural matters. Mintrom and Norman
(2009) cite their ability to deﬁne policy problems and be receptive to actors from state,
public and private quarters variously when windows of opportunity arise. This can
include the tactical dramatization of issues in terms of a crisis (after Stone 1997). Such
activity amounts to what we term cooperative ﬂexibility.
Some recent work has focused on the inﬂuence which diﬀerent non-state interest
groups attempt to exert around prominent moments of international public policy
making, such as diplomatic conferences, or in our case WRC-15. One aspect of this is
the circumstances in which so-called outside lobbying strategies – deﬁned as awareness
raising of issues through use of public communication media and thus indirect addressing
of policy makers – might be utilized (Hanegraaﬀ, Beyers, & De Bruycker, 2016). Another
aspect of this work tackles the possible nature of interaction that might be pursued by non-
state actors in relation to those with policy-making authority. Beyers and Hanegraaﬀ
(2017) highlight what they term confrontational interaction, underpinned by the actor’s
desire to provide an argument to policy makers to secure a change of perspective. It
might also be possible for a confrontational approach to be adopted in more open situ-
ations, where a policy maker has is an open mind on a topic, as occurs during a consul-
tation process – in the media sector in Europe, in our case.
Mahoney (2007, p. 370) argues that actors may be attracted to the idea of coalition for-
mation ‘in political systems where policymakers are highly attuned to cues about public
support for policy proposals, as they are when they are directly elected.’ Broadcast services
are intrinsically bound into the experience and well being of citizens any changes to which
can prove highly sensitive. Put plainly, broadcasting services can mean a lot to a lot of
people. Accountability of the political structure is an important variable in the institutional
framework for spectrum decision-making in the EU, since, whilst technically complex and
contributed to by a range of sectoral specialists, states nevertheless remain ‘the primary
agents’ (Delaere & Cullell-March, 2014, p. 363). The European Commission plays an
important role in spectrum policy-making through formulating initial policy proposals,
co-decided ultimately by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Here,
member state spectrum usage characteristics – such as how many people rely on digital
terrestrial TV services in our case – are highly inﬂuential.1 As we show, divergent
member states’ circumstances in terms of spectrum usage and lack of harmonization of
spectrum assignment, shaped EU spectrum policy in line with the demands of the
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broadcasting community under the Wider Spectrum Group. We draw on Klüver (2013, p.
200) who concludes that ‘member state support is a crucial determinant of interest group
inﬂuence during the decision-making stage’ and that ‘[t]he likelihood that interest groups
succeed in shifting the policy outcome towards their ideal points increases with the
number of member states supporting their objective’.
Mahoney notes that the salience of policy issues is an important factor in coalition for-
mation (Mahoney, 2007, pp. 371–372). In our case, prior to 2015, broadcasters – the
incumbents of the UHF radio spectrum bands in question – lost portions of the so-
called upper bands (i.e., 700 and 800 MHz) in two consecutive international spectrum
re-allocations in the ITU’s WRC meetings of 2007 and 2012. Importantly, Resolution
233 of WRC-2012 stipulated a potential further re-allocation of frequencies from broad-
casters to mobile broadband operators in the sub-700 MHz band, which was to be decided
at WRC-2015. The scene was thus set for a detailed and fractious debate on spectrum in
Europe in the years leading to WRC-15.
As we show, the creation of a broadcasting ad hoc coalition to articulate its arguments
jointly proved crucial. Klüver, Braun, and Beyers (2015, p. 483), note that the choice of a
particular argument frame is a strategic decision. Further, a lack a resources can mean that
this is the only tool available to attempt to exercise inﬂuence. Here, the relationship
between the interest group and the ‘contextual characteristics’ of issues at stake is signiﬁ-
cant. In our case, we show how civil society actors highlighted economic issues – as much
as the more predictable socio-cultural matters they tend to be concerned with – to play to
the primary interests of spectrum policy makers and in the process displaying signiﬁcant
argument diversiﬁcation capacity. In Table 1, we draw from the ﬁndings of the above lit-
erature to present a framework displaying the core contextual and processual features of
civil society activism as alignment in spectrum public policy, which are used hereafter to
illuminate our case.
The Institutional Framework for EU Radio Spectrum Decision-Making in
the Lead-up to ITU’s WRC-15: Access Points for Stakeholder Participation
As a specialized agency of the UN, the ITU is the foremost intergovernmental organization
responsible for regulating electronic communications globally. In the area of radio fre-
quencies, it holds an exclusive mandate to allocate and manage spectrum. Radio Regu-
lations that are adopted at its WRCs which take place every three to four years, are
binding for all member states (ITU Radio Regulations, n.d.). The whole cycle of
decision-making, however, has resembled a public-private cooperation (El-Moghazi,
Whalley, & Irvine, 2012, p. 9) which includes the active participation of private sector
members that carry out the technical studies and reports in preparation for each WRC
meeting. Currently, the organization has more than 700 non-state ‘sector members’ and
industry ‘associates’2 (ITU Members, n.d.). This has generated an informal division of
labour in which most technical work in radio frequency decision-making is conducted
by corporate members (McCormick, 2007, p. 70), while the role of representing the
public interest has been assigned to the state (Irion, 2009, pp. 2–3) since civil society
access to the ITU decision-making processes is marginal. High membership fees (see
ITU Membership Fees, n.d.) as well as lack of solid technical expertize have restricted
meaningful civil society participation (Horvitz, 2009).
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Historically, the assigned primary occupants of the UHF (470–862 MHz) band have
been terrestrial broadcasters. At the ITU’s WRC held in 2007 (WRC-07), frequencies in
the 700 and 800 MHz bands were re-allocated to mobile communications in ITU
Region 2 (Americas) and Region 3 (Asia-Paciﬁc), while Region 1 (Europe, Middle East,
Africa) preserved the 700 MHz band for terrestrial broadcasting (Ala-Fossi & Bonet,
2018, p. 346). European countries successfully opposed US demands for the global
release of both bands for mobile use. At WRC-12, however, European states were taken
by surprise when their Arab and African counterparts proposed to make available the
700 MHz band for mobile use on a co-primary basis in ITU Region 1, to come into
eﬀect at the end of the subsequent WRC-15 (Ala-Fossi & Bonet, 2018, p. 346; ITU Resol-
ution 232, 2012). Another resolution set in place at the WRC-12 turned out to be even
more controversial. In line with Resolution 233 (ITU Resolution 233, 2012), member
states were asked to identify additional frequency bands for allocation to mobile com-
munications services, which potentially included the spectrum occupied by broadcasters
in the so-called sub-700 MHz band (470–694/698 MHz) (ITU, 2015).
The EU has relied on its own body, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), to assist
the European Commission in establishing the Union’s common positions for ITU confer-
ences. RSPG members include senior representatives from regulatory authorities or min-
istries of the 28 EUmember states and representatives of the European Commission. Most
of its policy reports, opinions, and strategies are open to public consultations, which oﬀer
clear access points to stakeholders to contribute to the decision-making process. In the
lead-up to WRC-15, the RSPG invited stakeholders to express their views on (1) a
Draft Opinion on Common Policy Objectives for WRC-15 (RSPG Consultation,
2014a), and (2) a Draft Opinion on a Long-term Strategy for the UHF band in Europe
(RSPG Consultation, 2014b). The ‘common policy objectives’ adopted at the EU level
are aimed at uniting EU Member States in their WRC positions.
In order to facilitate the development of an EU consensus on the use of spectrum allo-
cated to broadcasting, in 2014, the then Digital Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, created the
High Level Group on the Future of the UHF band (470–790 MHz), chaired by former EU
Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy. The composition of the Lamy Group included
broadcasters (Mediaset, ARD, MTV Media, BBC); broadcast network operators (TDF,
Albertis Telecom, OiV); mobile network operators (Vodafone, Telefonica, Deutsche
Telekom, Orange, Teliasonera, KPN) and technical and trade associations from both quar-
ters (GSMA, BNE, EBU, Digital Europe, APWPT) (European Commission, 2014). Only
one member came from civil society: the Community Media Forum Europe, making
internal lobbying strategies highly diﬃcult for civil society. Despite a fractious process
in which diﬀerences between its broadcasting and mobile communications members
were clear, the Lamy Group opened its recommendations to a public consultation in
2015, which, as outlined below, established the basis of the EU’s spectrum approach
regarding broadcasting.
In order to reduce potential diﬀerences between EU member states’ spectrum policy
positions and those of the European continent as a whole, the EU has reduced its level
of direct involvement in the ITU in the last decade. Instead, the ITU’s pan-European
regional body, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Adminis-
trations (CEPT), has assumed prominence in preparations for upcoming WRCs
(Shahin, 2011, p. 693 in Ala-Fossi & Bonet, 2018, p. 346). The CEPT’s European
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Communications Committee (ECC) is responsible for harmonization and spectrum use
policy development. Its Conference Preparatory Group (CPG) has been in charge of devel-
oping the general European Common Proposals (ECPs) for WRC meetings. CEPT
members are responsible for national level policy design and regulation (CEPT, 2009)
for 49 states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Intergovernmental organizations
for telecommunications from other regions, as well as the European Commission and
the European Free Trade Association, may attend meetings as observers, without
having a right to vote.
Work on preparations for WRC-15 commenced in April 2012 (ECC, 2012), and, in
June 2013, the ECC announced the creation of a new Task Group (TG6) to study the
future of the 470–694 MHz band in the light of WRC-12’s Resolution 233 (ECC, 2013).
Between 2013 and 2015, the TG6 held two joint workshops with the European Commis-
sion. The workshops collected stakeholders’ reactions to the draft European Common
Proposals for WRC-15 (Joint European Commission-CEPT Workshop, 2015). This
oﬀered another window of opportunity for interested parties, such as the representatives
of the digital technology industry in Europe (Digital Europe) and the broadcasting sector
(European Broadcasting Union) to participate in the debate. Importantly, in terms of
capacity for internal lobbying strategies, no civil society groups were present on the
agendas of these events.
Strategic Alignment and the Framing of European Civil Society Arguments
in the WRC-15 Debate on Spectrum
The debate over the future of UHF spectrum in Europe was noteworthy for being a policy
area that united both public service and commercial broadcasters which have not been
typical allies when it comes to other broadcasting policy issues. Additionally, since the
introduction of digital terrestrial broadcasting, spectrum policy issues in Europe have
been particularly important for private broadcast network operators, in charge of the
infrastructure for transmission of digital broadcasting services in Europe. These include
companies such as Arqiva in the UK, ORS in Austria and 14 other operators, as part of
the Broadcast Networks Europe (BNE) association. In order to bring to the attention of
EU policy-makers the breadth, but also the concerted nature, of the broadcasting industry
actors’ positions, the BNE initiated the formation of the Wider Spectrum Group (WSG) as
a follow-up to the Lamy Group. WRC-2015 was the key reason for its constitution. The
WSG was aware of the risk of allowing the well-organized and well-funded mobile broad-
band sector to establish its argument for more spectrum (Digital UK interviewee, June 10,
2016).
The BNE ﬁrst turned to the broadcasters’ representatives, the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU) to galvanize support in an ad hoc coalition. The EBU was the only
member of the group which was an ITU member and became the ‘main co-operator’ in
the BNE (BNE interviewee, July 20, 2016). BNE acted strategically to broaden its
support base through bringing in commercial providers of Programme Making and
Special Events (PMSE) services, like wireless microphones and wireless in-ear monitor
(IEM) systems used mainly in large venues and productions. These companies co-
existed historically with broadcasters in the UHF band, utilizing the so-called ‘white
spaces’ left unoccupied by broadcasters to avoid transmission interference. They were
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represented by Pearle* – Live Performance Europe and the Association of Professional
Wireless Production Technologies (APWPT). The WSG was also strengthened by the
European Coordination of Independent Producers (CEPI), which represented media pro-
duction companies across the continent.
The establishment of the core of this ad hoc coalition by its most strongly resourced
actors provided a window of opportunity for civil society organizations to align themselves
with the position of the WSG. The latter was particularly receptive to the Uni Global
Union – Media, Entertainment and Arts (UNI MEI) and the European Federation of Jour-
nalists (EFJ). The most prominent civil society organization members, however, turned
out to be those representing the interests of viewers and listeners. The long established
VLV joined the group, acting as a link to its European level equivalent, the European Alli-
ance of Listeners’ and Viewers’ Associations (Euralva), which was not at the time a
member. These actors displayed considerable cooperative ﬂexibility by working in line
with the interests of a diverse range of organizations in the WSG. They asserted arguments
against reallocation of spectrum away from broadcasting and towards mobile communi-
cations. They were strident in opposing any views from the mobile communications and
IT industry that argued for a co-primary and so-called ‘ﬂexible’ utilization of the sub-
700 MHz band, notably the potential introduction of a downlink option for one way trans-
mission of broadcast content to mobile devices in the band (see BITKOM, 2015).
As the work of the Lamy Group developed throughout 2014, the inﬂuence exerted by
the broadcasting constituency became evident. In the UK, the VLV worked with the EBU
and Digital UK3 to contribute to the shaping of the debates held in the lead up to the Lamy
Report (VLV interviewee, June 21, 2016). This inﬂuence soon became clear when the
Report acknowledged that DTT had formed the ‘backbone’ of the European audiovisual
model, oﬀering free ‘quality programming’ and accomplishing ‘major public policy objec-
tives, such as cultural diversity and media pluralism’ (Lamy Report, 2014, p. 3). Although
unable to reach a consensus between the participants of the High Level Group, Lamy
oﬀered a compromise position that promised to provide ‘certainty’ and ‘predictability’
of spectrum resources for the broadcasting sector. He proposed the so-called ‘20–25–30
model’ which envisaged freeing the 700 MHz band for mobile communications by
2020, preserving the sub-700 MHz band for broadcasting until 2030, whilst carrying
out a stock-taking exercise by 2025. This satisﬁed the broadcasters’ side. Yet, in line
with the preferences of the mobile broadband constituency, the Lamy Report also pro-
duced a recommendation, endorsed by the RSPG and the ECC, whereby member states
would be able to allow supplemental downlink for mobile broadband content in the
sub-700 MHz band (Lamy Report, 2014). The report set the tone for EU’s WRC-15 pos-
ition on the sub-700 MHz band which, in eﬀect, followed Lamy’s proposals (VLV inter-
viewee, June 21, 2016; BNE interviewee, July 20, 2016).
The WSG capitalised on the window of opportunity provided by the Lamy Report’s
acknowledgment of the success of the European audiovisual model and praised its ‘evi-
dence-based proposals’ (Digital UK interviewee, June 10, 2016) through external lobbying
tactics. UNI MEI was active here and showed its argument diversiﬁcation capacity by
linking the production of diverse content with employment growth in an ecosystem
that ‘represent[ed] 14 million jobs and €860bn of turnover in Europe’ (WSG, 2015).
The WSG was keen to remind policy makers that the EU audiovisual industry had both
economic and cultural signiﬁcance. A BNE representative noted that broadcasting ‘had
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created jobs and this was of huge relevance to the EU policy-makers, who have been trying
to save pan-EU business models’ (BNE interviewee, July 20, 2016).
Showing further argument diversiﬁcation capacity in civil society quarters, Euralva
linked market power arguments to the interests of its own constituency, arguing that
[a] weakened DTT platform [would] result in powerful gatekeepers and too much market
power in the hands of players (e.g., telecommunications operators) who have not been
subject to content regulation traditionally, thereby putting at risk the signiﬁcant public
policy goals associated with DTT. (Euralva, 2015a)
Euralva aligned itself with broadcasting players in utilizing evidence based tactics in a
direct and forceful external confrontational challenge, demanding ‘transparency of [sic]
the way theMT [mobile telecommunications] andWBB [the wireless broadband] industry
is using already allocated spectrum’ (Euralva, 2015a, 2015b). It requested ‘studies about
the incremental value of further spectrum allocations to the MT/WBB industry’ and point-
edly asked ‘What could the MT/WBB industry offer with this and further (as demanded)
allocations that would be so exceptional and would far outweigh the substantial economic,
social and cultural value that the DTT platform currently offers?’ (Euralva, 2015b). This
perspective, bolstered by media industry players, suggested that DTT has returned
greater value from spectrum than mobile operators,4 which have increasingly ofﬂoaded
mobile communications trafﬁc to Wi-Fi providers using unlicensed spectrum bands
(ARD, 2015; Arqiva, 2015; Wik and Aegis, 2013). This research was seized upon to
argue that there was thus less need for additional spectrum. Furthermore, the broadcast
industry lobby argued that the introduction of the downlink ‘ﬂexibility option’ presented
potential risks of interference with DTT and PMSE licensees (ARD, 2015; EBU, 2015a) in
a clear reference to the quality of service experience of viewers at the core of VLV interests.
The VLV aligned itself with this, but reinforced it with the more confrontational, emotive
view of downlinking as a ‘Trojan Horse’ that would effectively mean a co-primary allo-
cation of the sub-700 MHz part of the spectrum (VLV, 2015).
For the WSG, the negotiations at WRC-15 were pivotal in respect of item 1.1 which
required states to identify additional frequency bands for allocation to mobile services
on a primary basis, potentially including the sub-700 MHz band. The 700 MHz band real-
location (agenda item 1.2) was, by contrast, in eﬀect regarded as a fait accompli (Euralva
interviewee, June 13, 2016). The organization of the European broadcasting constituency
proved highly eﬀective. The WRC-15 meeting concluded that the sub-700 MHz band
spectrum in Region 1 would remain exclusively for broadcasting. The re-allocation of
this band would not be part of the WRC-19 agenda, while a review of the whole UHF
band was scheduled for WRC 2023 (EBU, 2015b). As a result, it is unlikely that any
change of policy regarding the sub-700 MHz band will take place until the subsequent
WRC, set to take place in 2027, an outcome signiﬁcantly in line with the broadcast con-
stituency’s position.
The Signiﬁcance of Civil Society Strategic Alignment Activism in the
European Policy Debate on Spectrum
Focusing on civil society involvement in recent European spectrum policy debates through
the lens of strategic alignment constructed in this article enables new light to be shed on
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the context and process of such activity. Whilst relatively poorly resourced compared to
other protagonists in spectrum debate, organizations such as VLV, Euralva and UNI
MEI were well enough established in their respective ﬁelds to have amassed suﬃcient tech-
nical resources and expertize to play a signiﬁcant part in the WSG. They were able to
utilize the key knowledge asset of a strong general sectoral understanding, as well as
speciﬁc knowledge of the position of media workers, and the viewer and listener. This
set the ground for them to demonstrate their capacity to deﬁne plausibly, from their
speciﬁc perspectives, the problems at the heart of the debate on possible spectrum reallo-
cation away from broadcasters towards mobile broadband providers. They possessed
suﬃcient experience and standing to be taken seriously by a range of better resourced –
though highly receptive – actors from the broadcasting industry in the WSG. They
showed themselves amenable to alignment with these actors which were outside their
speciﬁc domain of activity and interest. The most noteworthy aspect of this was their
lining up alongside players from production and (often commercial) service provision.
Civil society actors, more than any others in the broadcasting coalition, were able to
embody and articulate the sustained importance of free to air digital terrestrial television
to core electoral constituencies of interest at the national level across the EU. For example,
the VLV argued that the delivery of high deﬁnition pictures to mobile handsets did not
make sense in the current technological environment (because of the bandwidth require-
ments entailed in doing so). It has also contended that it
is important to make choices on spectrum based on what broadcasters are actually doing
rather than on what the mobile sector argues it might deliver in the future. It is interesting
to note that consumers replace their TV sets every six to eight years whereas mobile consu-
mers replace their handsets every twelve to eighteen months currently. (VLV interviewee,
June 21 2016)
As a small and modestly funded organization, the VLV has demonstrated strong civil
society orientations, tapping into the expertize of other like-minded organizations on key
spectrum issues to build often technical arguments around viewers’ and consumers’ per-
spectives. Thus, joining broader sectoral coalitions such as the WSG has provided it with a
crucial opportunity to obtain information on the procedures of the decision-making at
WRCs, and the lobbying tactics applied by mobile operators and broadcasters. According
to an interviewee,
without knowing what has happened behind closed doors at WRC-15, it will be diﬃcult to
know how to campaign for the retention of free to air broadcast television both before and at
WRC-19. It is important to know who did what and when to be able to plan ahead and to be
eﬀective in inﬂuencing both the British government and, by extension, the WRC itself in the
run-up to its next meeting in 2019. (VLV interviewee, May 19, 2016)
The policy fulcrum of WRC-15 created windows of opportunity through which civil
society voices could be articulated. Spectrum by that stage had assumed a high degree
of policy salience. These factors combined to create an opportunistic context for civil
society to undertake an effective process of strategic alignment to resist change to the
sub-700 MHz part of the spectrum.
The process of civil society activism in the spectrum policy debate shows the prepon-
derance of confrontational outside lobbying tactics. None of the civil society broadcast
actors most active in the spectrum debate had direct inside access to the EU’s Lamy
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Group. A barrier like this is nothing new for civil society. The case of spectrum shows
clearly a consequential utilization of the outside lobbying modus operandi. However,
the opportunity – but also the responsibility – entailed in strategic alignment motivated
a more nuanced approach that meant that civil society generated more than simply
noisy protest in line with its direct interests. In order to do realize this, civil society
actors were required to broaden and diversify their argument set as shown, in line with
the interests of fellow non-civil society members of the ad hoc coalition.
Whilst the broadcasting industry was able to provide its own strong arguments for the
retention of the 470–694 MHz band for terrestrial broadcasting in Europe, UNI MEI, for
example, advanced arguments for retaining spectrum allocation in terms of ensuring the
maintenance of content diversity, which sat beyond its core interest of employment rights.
The debate also evidenced the employment by civil society bodies of a strongly confronta-
tional challenges to the mobile communication industry, using language mostly associated
with the latter’s arguments to be allowed to occupy new parts of the spectrum. Euralva
went outside what could be regarded as its core remit through making strident calls for
studies to establish both the practical need and relative value of more spectrum allocation
to the mobile industry. It also produced economic arguments around market structure and
linked them to a potential detrimental impact on the historic public policy goals of digital
terrestrial television. This kind of issue linkage and development took its place among a
raft of technical arguments propounded by the broadcasting industry, which in their
turn were linked to the public interest matters of universal coverage, as well as the
ability to secure future spectrum eﬃciency generating innovations through research and
development.
Post-WRC-15 EU Policy on Spectrum: The Signiﬁcance of Member State
Preferences and National Broadcasting Characteristics
A BNE representative, reﬂecting on the outcome of WRC-15, described it as a ‘victory’ for
the WSG, though not the ‘end of the war’ since WRC 2023 would be a crucial event (BNE
interviewee, July 20, 2016). Euralva also sounded a cautionary note in declaring a ‘con-
ditional victory’ for the broadcasters’ coalition (Euralva interviewee, June 13, 2016). The
WSG as a pressure group had created strong and persuasive arguments. Yet, very impor-
tantly, there was acknowledgement that it was impossible to attribute this success causally
to the formation of the coalition alone (Digital UK interviewee, June 10, 2016), since it was
evident that a number of European national regulators and policy-makers were opposed to
the kind of changes favoured by mobile broadband providers. Yet, following the con-
clusion of WRC-15, the European Commission submitted a Proposal for a decision on
the use of the 470–790 MHz frequency band in the Union. This was regarded by an inter-
viewee from the BNE as the ‘greatest challenge’ from the European Commission to the
broadcasting constituency’s position (BNE interviewee, July 20, 2016). Nevertheless, the
outcome of this ultimate phase of EU decision making on the matter proved very much
in line with the broadcasting sector’s preferences and is thus important to consider.
The Commission argued that its proposal would harmonize the use of the UHF band in
order to achieve the Union’s connectivity targets of universal wireless broadband coverage
at high transmission speeds. This, in return, would ‘boost mobile network capacity’ and
facilitate the deployment of 5G mobile broadband services and the Internet of Things
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(European Commission, 2016, p. 6). The Commission advocated use of the ‘ﬂexible’
approach suggested in the Lamy Report,5 meaning that, depending on national spectrum
use and demands, the band could be shared between the incumbent audiovisual (DTT,
PMSE) and the wireless broadband services providers. In order to avoid interference
between these users, the Commission proposed that the latter’s activities would be
limited to a ‘downlink-only’ mode. This was
proposed to accommodate varying situations in the EU. Some Member States hardly used the
470–694 MHz for DTT, and are therefore able to deploy alternative transmission in the fre-
quency band, while other countries, as heavy users of DTT, [wer]e provided with a safeguard
that alternative use is limited. (EPRS, 2017)
A documentary analysis of the ﬁnal version of the Decision on the matter adopted by
the EU on 17 May 2017 (European Commission, 2017) through the co-decision process is
telling, since almost all of the Commission’s articles in the originally proposed draft were
amended by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. This is important
since it highlights the signiﬁcance of political accountability and perceptions of public
support for change in spectrum policy, which provided a fertile ground for the preferences
of civil society actors from broadcasting to be realized. First, the Council extended the
deadline for the re-allocation of the 700 MHz band to wireless broadband users (European
Council, 2016) by up to two years after the initially proposed deadline of 30 June 2020,
provided that there were duly justiﬁable reasons for the delay.6 Second, the Council nego-
tiated the removal, from the original proposal, of the requirement on member states to
‘take all necessary measures to ensure a high-quality level of coverage of their population
and territory at speeds of at least 30 Mb/s’ (European Commission, 2016).
Third, the Council included an amendment which stipulated that the sub-700 MHz
band would remain available exclusively to DTT and PMSE services at least until 2030
(European Council, 2016). Fourth, it also rejected the downlink-only alternative use of
the sub-700 MHz band. Instead, any alternative uses of UHF spectrum would depend
on member states’ considerations of national needs for broadcasting provision. Fifth,
the Parliament and the Council also created a new article 6 in the ﬁnal version of the
Decision, which allowed compensation for the direct cost, incurred particularly by consu-
mers, from moving broadcasters out of the 700 MHz band. Finally, the Council rejected
granting the Commission the responsibility to carry out an assessment by 2025 of
‘whether it is necessary to change the use of the 470–694 MHz frequency band, or any
part of it’ (European Commission, 2016). The Commission was instead merely allowed
to report to the Council and the Parliament on the developments in the use of the sub-
700 MHz frequency band (European Commission, 2017).
The nature of these legislative changes suggests strongly that the broadcasting lobby
had substantially achieved its preferences. The EBU had argued that the downlink-only
option should be eschewed since it had ‘not yet been validated by technical studies and
market demand’ (EPRS, 2017, p. 7). It also contended that the 2020 deadline for releasing
the 700 MHz band was too short for broadcasters, ‘as it would neither allow suﬃcient time
to upgrade their DTT networks nor for consumers to upgrade their equipment’ (EPRS,
2017, p. 7). The BNE had argued for ‘guarantee[d] access of DTT services to the sub-
700 MHz band until at least 2030’ (EPRS, 2017, p. 7, emphasis added). It contended
that the 2020 deadline ‘for making the 700 MHz band available for wireless broadband
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should be extended until the end of 2022’ (EPRS, 2017, p. 7). All these demands were
reﬂected in – and became part of – the ﬁnal version of the EU Decision on the future
use of the UHF band. Clearly, as shown, for civil society actors, whilst not central
players, being strategically aligned with the broadcast industry constituency allowed
their preferences to be expressed and incorporated in the ultimately inﬂuential broadcast-
ing ad hoc coalition’s arguments.
Yet, it is also clear that a key factor in accounting for this policy outcome is the diver-
gent national circumstances in DTT use. Michalis (2016, p. 353) highlights that some
states, such as France and Germany, have already assigned the 700 MHz band for
mobile communications use, and others like Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK
are expected to follow suit. Rather diﬀerently, others, such as Italy and Spain, have signiﬁ-
cantly increased the numbers of new local broadcasting channels following the introduc-
tion of the DTT system where narrowing spectrum capacity available to broadcasters
would run counter to supporting these new service providers. More generally, the terres-
trial distribution of broadcasting services has remained of considerable importance in
most EU member states where nearly ‘half of all households (250 million people) rely
on DTT’. In countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain – but also France and the UK –
the DTT platform has been either the most dominant or the only one that has oﬀered uni-
versality of access (Michalis, 2016, p. 356).
Conclusion
The strategic alignment by civil society actors with interests from the broadcasting indus-
try in order to mount what turned out to be successful, though possibly temporary, oppo-
sition to change in the status of the 490–694 MHz band was classically ad-hoc in nature in
Pijnenburg’s terms: informal, time-limited, single issue and loose in character. Its aﬀor-
dances notwithstanding, it is important to understand that the strategic alignment
evident in this case provides civil society indirect and somewhat proxy access to policy
decision making that is valuable but highly contingent. However, what does evidence of
this article tell us about civil society actors’ ability to sustain and develop further their
alignment capacity in the future?
This is likely to hinge on three core factors. First, the WRC-15 debate allowed the estab-
lishment of an informal cooperative understanding between publicly funded and private
broadcast interests and civil society. The extent to which this can be strengthened into
the future will be very important for civil society actors, should they wish to inﬂuence
the debates that will inevitably occur on spectrum allocation in coming years. In July
2017, Euralva formally joined theWSG, a development which further embeds the presence
of civil society in a coalition which has proven to be highly signiﬁcant in European spec-
trum policy in recent years. Second, civil society actors will need to be able to build on the
evidence they have shown in this debate to display breadth of argumentation and technical
understanding of core issues. This amounts to sustaining the ability to move beyond noisy
protest – albeit that the latter is useful up to a point – to achieve persuasiveness. To date,
there is little evidence of the ability of civil society actors to achieve their preferences
through inside lobbying and this is unlikely to change a ﬁeld dominated by large corporate
interests. Thus, outside lobbying tactics, such as those witnessed to date, would appear the
most useful to focus upon. Third, whilst civil society actors have shown some ability to
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provide sophisticated normative and instrumental strategic responses to changes in their
external environment, this needs to be developed further in the light of future changes
which are likely to occur in the mobile media environment and which will form part of
a likely highly controversial debate on future changes to the sub-700 MHz part of the spec-
trum in years to come. For example, representatives of viewers and listeners will need to
understand, and come to a position on, the extent to which using more spectrum for
personal mobile broadband services has entailed within it a public interest function. It
is realistic to point out that as the broadband environment evolves in the EU over the
next 10–15 years, more spectrum is likely to be assigned in the direction of the mobile
broadband sector. Broadcasting service delivery is also likely to gravitate even further
towards the Internet. Thus, what constitutes the public interest in media is likely to be
subject to detailed examination and signiﬁcant change.
As shown above, the public interest arguments put forward by key elements of the
broadcasting industry at the core of the ad hoc coalition, and with the strongest strategic
economic interests in the debate, proved an important factor in the decision of Member
States support the no change position to the sub-700 MHz band allocation. These
highly speciﬁc conditions allowed civil society interests to be accommodated and endorsed
but this outcome can be viewed as circumstantial. It shows howmuch the public interest in
spectrum policy relies on network operators and service providers, and the nation state,
ultimately. Potential change in the interests of the broadcasting industry as Internet Pro-
tocol technology evolves over the next decade underlines the highly contingent and thus
precarious position of civil society interests in broadcasting, where the decisive role of the
nation state on spectrum policy in Europe is unlikely to be static and, importantly, to
become more receptive to civil society interests acting alone.
Notes
1. In addition, as seen in the section below, the common EU spectrum policy positions for ITU’s
WRCs, are agreed within the EU’s Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), an advisory body
to the European Commission, whose members include delegations of senior representatives
from member states’ regulatory bodies and relevant ministries. In Europe as a region, the
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications (CEPT) is formed by national
representatives on telecommunications regulation and other inter-governmental organiz-
ations as observers, which the European Commission is only one of. Thus, by and large, spec-
trum decision-making remains a policy area where states are primary actors, both as regards
supranational (EU) and global (ITU) domains.
2. While the former are eligible to ‘participate in all activities in ITU, including chairing groups,
take part in consensus-based decisions, and make contributions to all meetings’, the latter can
participate in a single study group in one of the three ITU sectors (Radiocommunication –
ITU-R; Telecommunication Standards – ITU-T; Telecommunication Development – ITU-
D) (ITU Members, n.d.).
3. Owned by Arqiva, the BBC, Channel 4 and ITV in the UK.
4. See, in particular, Digital UK (2014).
5. As well as RSPG’s Report on a ‘Proposed spectrum coordination approach for broadcasting
in the case of a reallocation of the 700 MHz band’ (RSPG, 2013) and Opinion on a ‘Long-
term strategy on the future use of UHF band (470–790 MHz) in the European Union’
(RSPG, 2015).
6. Upon the proposal of the European Parliament rapporteur who lead and coordinated the
amendment of the document, MEP Patricia Toia, the list of justiﬁable reasons were added
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as an Annex to the ﬁnal version of the Decision (European Council, 2017). They include
reasons such as (1) unresolved cross-border coordination issues resulting in harmful inter-
ferences; (2) the need to ensure, and the complexity of ensuring, the technical migration
of a large amount of the population to advanced broadcasting standards; (3) the ﬁnancial
costs of transition exceeding the expected revenue generated by award procedures; (4)
force majeure’ (European Council, 2017).
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